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1 Introduction
The European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS) proposal may be
puzzling for accountants because it falls between the two different metrics for
measuring a government’s income and wealth, namely an accrual-based
accounting system and the system of national accounts which has its own
accrual methodology (Jones, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2014).
The main objective of this paper is to discuss the EPSAS proposal in the
context of UK government accounting and budgeting. The paper starts by con-
sidering the ambivalent involvement of Eurostat in the proposed public standards
for government accounting of EU member states and tries to make sense of the
underlying “logic”. Then we try to anticipate the UK government’s reaction to the
proposal in the context of the fundamentals of the UK’s government accounting
system and traditions. This takes the argument into the role of the UK Whole of
Government Accounts as a government tool at both micro- and macro-levels, and
hence the overlap with national accounting rules especially with regards to
consolidation. Following the UK perspective, the conclusion attempts to rationa-
lise the role and utility of the proposed EPSAS for other EU member states.
2 The proposal for European public sector
accounting standards
Eurostat is the statistical arm of the EU Commission; as such, it is the EU’s
custodian of the system of national accounts (globally known as the System of
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National Accounts [SNA]; the EU’s, conforming but more detailed, version is
the European System of National and Regional Accounts [ESA951]). Eurostat’s
relationship to all of accounting is the same as the national accounts’ relation-
ship to accounting: it gathers data from accounting (among other places) and
transforms these data into the national accounts.
The proposal for EPSAS was made by Eurostat. It emerged from a process
that began, in 2011, with the EU proposal to require each member state to adopt
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), which rather quickly
retreated to a requirement for the Commission to assess the suitability of IPSAS,
and then with said assessment to be carried out specifically by Eurostat (2012).
As part of this assessment, the proposal for the adoption of IPSAS became a
proposal to develop EPSAS based on IPSAS, and at the same time, converging
the new accounting standards with those used for national accounting, namely
the ESA95 (Eurostat, 2013).
Part of the puzzle of the EPSAS proposal is that it is far from obvious why a
statistical agency would now become the custodian of government accounting in
the member states: what have statistics to do with accrual accounting? It is one
thing to say that the statistics draw from the records of transactions that are the
essence of accounting (whether cash- or accrual-based); but quite another to say
that the statistics have any relation to accrual-based financial statements. Globally
and within the EU, the development of the concepts and measurement rules of the
SNA have played no role in the development of accrual accounting; nor vice versa.
The “logic” of the EPSAS proposal appears to be as follows: the eurozone has
overtly been in crisis since 2008; some governments in the eurozone have serious
fiscal problems; an inherent weakness of the eurozone itself is that the govern-
ment of each member state – rather than the EU as a whole – has sovereignty over
each government’s fiscal policies; budgetary surveillance by the EU of each
government’s fiscal policies is, therefore, faute de mieux; one aspect of the euro-
zone crisis was (still is?) weak surveillance of some governments’ budgets (see e.g.
Schuknecht, Moutot, Rother, & Stark, 2011, p. 15); and that, since national
accounts provide the framework for the data required by that surveillance, there
is a need to improve the data (see e.g. Bowles, 2013). If that could serve as the
broad logic of the proposal, then it would follow that the custodian of national
accounts, Eurostat, would naturally have the responsibility for said improvement.
The logic is included in Eurostat’s (2012, p. 2) own words:
Budgetary surveillance in the EU is based on the European System of Accounts (ESA). ESA
is a macro-economic accounting framework based on accruals principles, which is not
1 The ESA 2010 updates the ESA 95 and is applicable from September 2014.
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designed for entity-level accounting. ESA based statistics are in practice a transformation
of “primary” accounts, established on the basis of Member States’ national accounting
standards. Member States’ national public sector accounting standards are, in the majority,
not accrual based. … the Commission supports the implementation of public sector
accounting standards providing the information needed to compile ESA-based data for
all sub-sectors of general government.
But the puzzle is how “EPSAS transformed from IPSAS” can emerge as providing
the needed information. On “Budgetary surveillance”: IPSAS explicitly have
nothing to do with budgeting. On “ESA is not designed for entity-level account-
ing”: entity-level accounting, which is what IPSAS are, was similarly not
designed for the ESA; IPSAS, having been drawn from International
Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), are
based on entity-level business accounting standards that have never had the
SNA in mind. Finally, IPSAS are inextricable from an independent audit provid-
ing an opinion on the fairness of the resultant financial statements, based on a
set of auditing standards: on this, the EPSAS proposal is silent.
Added to all that, everyone knows (including Eurostat) that it will take years
to produce any set of EPSAS, and many more for current cash-based systems in
the member states to convert to any accrual basis. It would hardly be surprising
to find that the EPSAS proposal was low in particular governments’ priorities.
3 A UK perspective on the EPSAS proposal
To our knowledge, the UK government (either as a whole or in any of its
significant parts) has taken no position on EPSAS. The Treasury, the National
Audit Office and Parliament have not commented. The Financial Reporting
Advisory Board (FRAB) of the Treasury is explicitly monitoring the development
of EPSAS; in the minutes of a recent meeting, the following was reported (para.
63, Minutes of Meeting, 13 December 2013):
[A Board member] asked where the developments [of EPSAS] were expected to take public
sector financial reporting. The Secretary noted that this is still unclear but given the
suggested timescales put forward by Eurostat we would expect to have a much better
understanding over the next 12 months…. Treasury confirmed that the expectation was a
clear link between EPSAS and ESA, indeed improvements to statistical reporting were the
driving force behind the project.
Subsequently, the FRAB (paras. 4 and 7, Minutes of Meeting, 3 April 2014) noted
that the UK Relevant Authorities monitoring the progress of the EPSAS project had
decided not to respond to Eurostat’s public consultation on EPSAS governance,
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and that a firm common position on the proposal would be determined after more
concrete communication is received from the EU Commission. While the use of
accrual accounting by public sector entities is supported, concern is expressed
concerning Eurostat’s goal of full harmonisation because:
it would not be possible for the individual public sector context of each Member State to be
taken properly into consideration … and would have a detrimental effect on Member States
like the United Kingdom who have already converted from cash to accrual accounting and
who use accrual throughout the public finance management system and not just for
financial reporting… It was felt that Eurostat’s central aim of improving macro-level
statistical reporting by ensuring the application of accrual accounting standards at the
micro-level could be met by other more proportionate approaches. (paras. 5 and 6, Minutes
of Meeting, 3 April 2014)
From our understanding of the development of accrual-based financial reporting
in the UK government, we would suggest that the UK government has little
interest in EPSAS themselves. As a member of the EU (albeit one whose member-
ship may well be subject to a referendum, either before or after the next general
election, in 2015), and with an active interest in everything concerned with the
euro (currently, short of membership of the eurozone), the UK government will
clearly continue to monitor and respond to any EPSAS proposals. But if indeed
the proposals are being driven by “statistical reporting”, the key question for the
UK government would be whether the data it currently provides for this “statis-
tical reporting” would in any way be improved by a set of EPSAS. And even if a
particular accounting policy developed within EPSAS did challenge an extant
UK policy, UK policy-making could easily substitute the new policy without
challenging the UK’s system as a whole. In fact, this sort of “accommodation”
is already being done by the UK Treasury. In the process of making IFRS
applicable to the public sector environment, the UK Treasury takes into con-
sideration ESA95 requirements, for example, the definition of which income is
considered as taxation, and the consolidation rules (HM Treasury, 2013b). In this
way, while still recognising that there are differences between IFRS for the
public sector and the ESA, such differences are reduced, and the raw data
extracted from the government accounting system can fit in easier within the
statistical reports.
On the question of whether EPSAS would be developed by a new policy-
making body, if EPSAS were to be limited to a role in “statistical reporting”, it is
presumably possible that they would be hermetically sealed within the require-
ments established by Eurostat for submission of data consistent with the ESA.
On its face, this would not require any separate body to promulgate the require-
ments. On the other hand, policy-making within the SNA (and, therefore, ESA)
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is, especially compared to business accounting, opaque; and given the scale of
the eurozone crisis, it does not seem unreasonable to question the role of
budgetary surveillance in it, a questioning that might point to a more formal
and transparent policy-making for the ESA.
If, however, EPSAS were to be seen to be developed as the accounting
policies for the financial accounting and reporting by government departments
and by the wholes of governments of member states, we would assume that the
UK government’s stance would be to undermine, and ultimately object to, their
development. We have no idea how the politics of this would work.
But setting aside the politics, and on the basis of the roots and current
manifestation of the UK’s financial accounting and reporting system, we would
suggest that the Treasury would not voluntarily cede its sovereign right to make
the UK government’s accounting policies to anyone.2 We would also suggest that
the Treasury would not voluntarily cede that sovereign right to the private sector,
within the UK or outside of it; in the specific case of IPSAS, it is not clear why the
Treasury would cede its right to a private sector body that is anyway doing what
the Treasury is doing, namely adapting IFRS to the governmental context. We
would further suggest that the Treasury would not voluntarily cede its sovereign
right to an EU institution: given the long, and separate, traditions of accounting
and auditing between the UK (not matters of law) and continental Europe (law),
this would be tantamount to fire conceding to ice (or vice versa) (Jones, 2005).
Finally, we would suggest that neither the Treasury nor the National Audit Office
would countenance auditors as accounting policy-makers: this would be anath-
ema to accounting as we understand it.
4 Some fundamentals of the UK’s system
Unlike Eurozone countries whose monetary policy is dictated by the European
Central Bank, the UK government is responsible for its own fiscal and
2 This is quite different from the harmonisation process for the private sector, which led to the
adoption of the IFRS in 2005. Compulsory adherence to IFRS requirements (as adopted by the
EU) is only required for the consolidated financial statements of a category of private sector
companies, being listed companies trading on a regulated market. This move was acceptable for
various reasons. Besides the possible advantages of such harmonisation for the UK financial
services industry, IFRS are similar to Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) issued by the UK
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) – the underlying concepts and objectives are basically the
same. Moreover, the FRC did not give up its role in issuing and updating FRS that are applicable
for other UK companies not required to be IFRS-compliant.
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monetary policies. As far as we are aware, neither the International Monetary
Fund nor the European Central Bank has a problem with the data that the UK
government is required to provide for budgetary surveillance. Budgeting and
accounting for the UK government, at both micro- and macro-levels, are – to a
degree unparalleled in the major countries of the EU and the US – the
responsibility of the executive, and specifically of the Treasury (Jones, Lande,
Lüder, & Portal, 2013, p. 435). At the micro-level (meaning for each government
department/agency and for the meta-consolidation we know as Whole of
Government Accounts), cash-based budgeting and accounting have been sup-
plemented by an accrual basis.
Jones et al. (2013) provide our current understanding of the government’s
accounting, except that we now have four consecutive years of Whole of
Government Accounts (2010–2013). To focus on policy-making specifically, the
2000 law3 that established accrual-based financial reporting requires the financial
statements of each department and of the whole of government to present a true
and fair view (a concept and legal requirement drawn from business accounting)
and to conform to generally accepted accounting practice (a concept drawn from
business accounting) subject to such adaptations as are deemed necessary by the
Treasury. The Treasury now uses EU-adopted IFRS as its point of departure for
each of its accrual-based policies (HM Treasury, 2013a, pp. 43, 217; Biondi, 2013b).
In this use of business accounting, the Treasury’s policies are, at bottom,
part of Anglo-American business accounting and auditing:
At the heart of this influential [Anglo-American] accounting and auditing is the require-
ment that the accounting policies are set by a private sector (nonprofit) body, formally
independent of the accounting profession and independent of the companies preparing the
financial statements, with compliance of those financial statements being judged in the
first instance by auditors in the private sector, responsible to their professional accounting
bodies (and, in the US, to a public body4), who are also independent of the companies
being audited. (Jones & Pendlebury, 2010, p. 14)
It is important in this to note that the creation of “EU-adopted” IFRS, in which
an EU institution can veto specific IFRS policies, does not seem to have funda-
mentally changed the Anglo-American nature of IFRS – yet.
Notwithstanding this dependence on Anglo-American business accounting,
there are two important divergences of the UK government’s system from this
3 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000.
4 In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), requires that auditors of US public companies be subject to external
and independent oversight. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has oversight
authority over the PCAOB.
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business accounting. The first is that the Treasury, in the end, sets its own
accounting policies. The second is that compliance with those policies is judged
by auditors (in the National Audit Office) who are not in the private sector and
who, indeed, are part of the state.
The extent of these two divergences is more difficult to define. Sovereign
governments are unique institutions and concepts of independence within and
outside them are, by their nature, slippery. In practice, there are ways of
securing optimal (never absolute) levels of independence of a Ministry of
Finance in setting accounting policies and of a supreme audit institution in
auditing their implementation.5
IPSAS have no current role in the UK government’s system. IPSAS are
inseparable from Anglo-American business accounting and auditing, except
that they were developed and continue to be promulgated by the accounting
profession itself, or at least by the world’s umbrella organisation for the account-
ing profession, which emphasises that it is “non-profit, non-governmental, non-
political” (Jones, 2004, p. 49), rather than by bodies now independent of the
accounting profession. In this, they may seem an obvious reference for the UK’s
system; but they are not. Indeed, as Jones et al. (2013, p. 430) report, while
IPSAS were previously referenced in the Treasury’s hierarchy of GAAP, this
reference was removed in 2012.
As explained in the opening section, the EPSAS proposal conflates accrual
accounting and budgetary surveillance. And, in a sense, the UK’s system does
too: its accrual micro-budgeting is determined by accounting standards. The
clear difference with the EPSAS proposal is that the UK’s accrual system is not
only one of budgetary surveillance: it is one of budgetary control. To what extent
the budgetary control system is cash-based and to what extent accrual-based is,
however, not clear-cut:
The UK is alone [among France, Germany and the US] in explicitly introducing accrual-
based information into the budget and the budgetary accounting. This distinction is unequi-
vocal but the details are not necessarily always clear in UK practice. The purely cash-based
system was retained and, since cash-based budgets appear alongside the accrual-based
equivalents, there are important respects in which it could be assumed that significant
decisions are still being taken with reference to the cash basis. (Jones et al., 2013, p. 435)
5 Unlike the UK Treasury, a company in the private sector does not set its own accounting
rules. And the independent audit firm that checks whether a company is complying with those
rules does not set its own audit rules. In this way, a framework is present that should enhance
the integrity of financial reporting by ensuring independence. Indeed, the human element can
undermine any regulatory system, but in the private sector both parties would pursue their own
separate private interests. In the public sector, both parties serve the same public interest.
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Three additional technical points might be made. First, the accrual-based bud-
gets do form the basis of budgeted accrual-based financial statements but these
budgeted financial statements are not prominent in budget documents, being
reported only as a footnote in the individual departmental and ministerial
reports. Second, the reporting of depreciation is technically complicated because
of the need to separate capital spending itself from depreciation. And third, it
was striking how the most radical part of the UK’s accrual budgeting – the
charge for the opportunity cost of capital – was so easily withdrawn by a new
government faced with the financial crisis post-2008: this did not sit well with
the idea that the accrual budgeting system had replaced cash budgeting (Jones
et al., 2013, p. 431).
Complementing cash-based budgetary accounting with accrual-based num-
bers is very complicated. This is obviously a problem for national governments
in a democracy, which are predicated on the centrality of politicians (in the
legislature and the executive), who cannot be assumed to understand accrual
budgeting and accounting. Whether managers of government departments can
be assumed to understand is an open question. Of course, there are now
(presumably) many people in the UK government who understand accrual-
based information but whether, or to what extent, this understanding affects
budgetary decision is not known by the literature.
We must now put all of this micro-budgeting and accounting into the
much wider responsibilities of the Treasury in macro-budgeting (and account-
ing). Jones (2014) points out that no one appears to have – or if they have, do
not appear willing to explain how they have – a comprehensive understanding
of the relationship between government accounting and national accounting,
and that at the heart of this lack of understanding is the lack of understanding of
the relationship between ex-post measures of government income and wealth
and ex ante measures. The UK system does provide large amounts of data,
especially in its budget documents, concerning this relationship.6 Statistical
measures as calculated in national accounting are shown on the budget. They
are described as targets, but it is not clear whether the link between decisions
taken on budgetary allocations and these targets is understood at all (Jones,
2000a).
The Whole of Government Accounts attempt to explain the connection
between the figures disclosed in the financial reports and those derived from
national accounts (HM Treasury, 2013a, Chapter 3). These data, however, are
hard to understand from the outside and are not underpinned by any conceptual
6 The Budget for 2014 also includes consideration of the impact of the ESA10 on some financial
measures (HM Treasury, 2014, pp. 21, 22, 113–115).
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framework or set of rules. National accounts apply a framework driven by
economic theory; and financial reporting applies its own framework based on
accounting theory; but reconciliations of the two systems appear pointless and
do not make much sense (Jones & Caruana, 2014). On the other hand, Heald and
Georgiou (2011, p. 446) call for well-documented reconciliations to reduce the
risk of accounting manipulation that would distort fiscal transparency.
5 Managing government financial risk
The UK system provides a set of annual audited accrual-based financial state-
ments for the government as a whole; albeit not, as yet, in a timely fashion nor
with an unqualified audit report. The utility of the UK’s Whole of Government
Accounts in measuring and thus managing government financial risk can be
viewed through the consolidation rules, the reported pension liabilities and the
resulting negative equity.
5.1 Consolidation
The UK’s meta-consolidation uses the SNA’s concept of the reporting entity for
government and provides discussion of how it is otherwise different from the
SNA (HM Treasury, 2013a, Chapter 3).
The three Commonwealth countries that produce Whole of Government
Accounts, that is, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, have all worked directly
with IFRS at some point or another but attempt to converge these accounting
requirements with national accounting requirements when it comes to consoli-
dation (Grossi et al., 2009, p. 211). In spite of this, differences in the boundary of
the reporting entity still arise between them, as pointed out by Heald and
Georgiou (2011, p. 473). While it appears that Australia has made the boldest
move by presenting SNA financial reports to Parliament and thus eliminating the
need of these reconciliations (Barton, 2011).
In an attempt to make these reconciliations understandable, Annexes 1, 2
and 3 of the UK Whole of Government Accounts list the entities consolidated in
the accounts; the entities not consolidated; and the minor entities that have
been excluded from the consolidation (HM Treasury, 2013a, pp. 197–218). The
Treasury justifies this limited consolidation boundary by stating that it is apply-
ing the same practices of the Office of National Statistics. The Auditor, however,
does not appear happy with this consolidation exercise because it is not in line
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with IFRS requirements (HM Treasury, 2013a, pp. 185–187), being the latter the
retained frame of reference that is expected to be applied.
With the help of these annexes, it is clear from the meta-consolidated
balance sheet which assets and liabilities have been included and which debate-
able assets and liabilities have not. It is also clear that by following SNA
concepts of consolidation, the meta-consolidated balance sheet is not as whole
as it purports to be (Chow, Humphrey, & Moll, 2007, 2008; Heald & Georgiou,
2009, 2011).
5.2 Pension liabilities
Depending on the purpose for which a financial liability is acquired, it will be
classified and accounted for either as a financial liability at fair value through
profit or loss or as other financial liability, which will be accounted for at
amortised cost (HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 56). The Treasury determines the classi-
fication of a financial liability. With particular reference to pension liabilities,
given that it is the largest liability recorded in the UK Whole of Government
Accounts,7 accounting for pensions can usefully be explained in more detail.
There are three major kinds of schemes that have different relationships with
Whole of Government Accounts.
The first kind is unfunded pension schemes within central government (e.g.
civil servants, armed forces, but also the health service and teachers). The
entities that employ the members of these schemes follow IAS 19 “Employee
Benefits” as interpreted for the public sector by the Treasury: meaning that they
are required to account for the contributions as being related to defined con-
tribution schemes (HM Treasury, 2013b, p. 2, Chapter 12). The financial state-
ments of the schemes themselves also follow IFRS and apply IAS 26 “Accounting
and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans” as interpreted for the public sector
context by the Treasury, with the result that they have no option but to disclose
the actuarially determined present value of promised retirement benefits within
the Statement of Financial Position (HM Treasury, 2013b, p. 4, Chapter 12). The
financial statements of these schemes are consolidated in the Whole of
Government Accounts.
The second kind of scheme, being the funded pension scheme, is, most
notably, for local government (refer to Table 1). There are many such schemes,
each for a group of local authorities, and all are, in principle, fully funded:
meaning that they were often in their history fully funded but sometimes, by
7 The total net pension liability stood at £1,007.8 billion as an 31 March 2012 (2010–2011
restated: £961.0 billion).
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deliberate action ultimately of central government, the current funding fell
below 100%. The net public sector pension liability of each of the funds is
included within the accounts of the employing local authorities and consoli-
dated in the Whole of Government Accounts (HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 108).
Finally, there is the state pension scheme (for the whole population) known
as National Insurance. This is an unfunded scheme, the financial transactions of
which are recorded in the National Insurance Fund. This fund is one of the core,
cash-based funds of the central government, managed by the Treasury. The
fund’s financial statements are consolidated in the Whole of Government
Accounts but, since they are cash-based, liabilities for future state pensions
are not included. Even if they could somehow be accrual-based, state pensions
would need to be reported differently from the other pension schemes applicable
to public sector employees, since state retirement pensions payable to the
general public are outside the scope of IAS 19.
The assets and liabilities shown in Table 2 are calculated as required by
accounting standards. The difference between the assets and liabilities should
represent the total liability faced by the public sector, but, as described shortly,
it does not fully reflect the effect of pensions on public finances in the future.
The total pension liabilities reflect the net present value of the total liability
owed to current pensioners, deferred pensioners (who are no longer in
Table 1: Analysis of the pension liability by type of scheme
2011–2012
£bn
2010–2011
Restated £bn
2011–2012
Percentage of
liability %
2010–2011
Percentage of
liability %
Unfunded schemes (gross)
Teachers (UK) 233.3 222.8 23 23
NHS (UK) 282.6 292.3 28 30
Civil service 155.1 145.0 15 15
Armed forces 105.6 100.6 11 11
Police 101.6 93.8 10 10
Fire 21.1 19.8 2 2
Other unfunded 20.0 19.9 2 2
919.3 894.2 91 93
Funded schemes (net)
Local government 78.4 57.7 8 6
Other funded 10.1 9.1 1 1
88.5 66.8 9 7
Total 1,007.8 961.0 100% 100%
Source: HM Treasury (2013a, p. 108).
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employment but will receive a pension on reaching retirement age) and current
employees (entitled to a pension on retirement). The liability allows for salaries
projected to retirement (or earlier leaving date), but only reflects the number of
years of service to date. The liability does not reflect the pension that may be
paid to current employees in respect of future years of service to retirement or to
future employees (HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 19).
The value of the public service pension liability is also very sensitive to
changes in assumptions that are inherently subject to significant uncertainty, for
example, the rate of increase in salaries and pensions inflation and the discount
rate.
The net pension liability of the government with regards to benefits for
public sector employees is, therefore, estimated and reported in the Whole of
Government Accounts and an explanation is given of how this, to some extent,
understates the effect of pensions on public finances (HM Treasury, 2013a, pp.
18–19). Moreover, at the end of the day, any shortfall in the cash required to
meet the payment of pensions is financed by the Exchequer (HM Treasury,
2013a, p. 103). The balance sheet of a government may resemble that of a
financial institution but it is important to bear in mind that it is not
(Newberry, 2011, p. 523). The Treasury’s role in managing financial risk is not
satisfied through the Whole of Government Accounts. The framework assisting
the Treasury’s role in managing the Government’s financial risk is wider than
this and includes the Spending Reviews (that set departmental spending bud-
gets over several years) and the Budget and estimates process (required to
obtain the statutory authority to consume resources and spend cash) (HM
Treasury, 2013a, pp. 28–29).
It is interesting to note that while the net liabilities in the Whole of
Government Accounts include the net public service pension liability for the
public sector employees, the National Accounts only recognise the cash pay-
ments and receipts associated with these pensions. The public service pension
liability is not included in public sector net debt reported to Eurostat.
Table 2: Total net pension scheme liability at 31 March 2012
Unfunded
schemes £bn
Funded
schemes £bn
Total £bn 2010–2011 restated
Total £bn
Gross liability 919.3 304.5 1,223.8 1,169.2
Gross assets − (216.0) (216.0) (208.2)
Net liability 919.3 88.5 1,007.8 961.0
Source: HM Treasury (2013a, p. 103).
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5.3 Negative equity
It is clear from the UK Whole of Government Accounts that there is very material
negative equity:
The balance sheet [at end of 09-10], of course, discloses negative equity (described as
“Total liabilities to be funded by future revenues”) – of £1,211,800,000,000.8 Since this
equity balance includes £758,900,000,000 of non-current, non-monetary assets valued at
current cost, future revenues probably have to be somewhat higher than £1.2tn. (Jones,
2012, p. 1 and p. 3)
On the face of it, to an accountant, it is peculiar that negative equity is the norm in
such meta-consolidations of government. As Heald and Georgiou (2011, p. 470)
put it: “Negative net assets for a government, which has the power to tax, do not
have the same implications as for a corporate entity”. It is to be expected that
lenders to national governments do not typically lend on the security of financial
or physical net assets; they lend on the security of future national income (Jones,
2014, p. 68). A numerical illustration of this is given by Biondi (2013a).
6 Summary conclusion
The UK Treasury does recognise that the Whole of Government Accounts is not a
substitute for the national accounts produced by the Office of National Statistics
(HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 21). It emphasises that while they are complementary,
the two systems have evolved independently of each other and refer to different
international standards. The Treasury recognises that the two systems have been
designed to suit different purposes:
While the National Accounts remain the measures used to assess the economic and fiscal
position of the UK for policy purposes, WGA (Whole of Government Accounts) provides an
accounting standards-based presentation to offer new insights into long-term sustainabil-
ity, as well as presenting the figures in a format familiar to the commercial sector. (HM
Treasury, 2013a, p. 21)
However, the Treasury acknowledges that both sets of reporting do not provide a
complete assessment of the future fiscal position of the public sector because
they exclude future revenues, assets and liabilities (HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 21).
Coupled with the fact that the Whole of Government Accounts are not as
8 As on 31 March 2012, negative equity stood at £1,347 billion (HM Treasury, 2013a, p. 40).
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“whole” as they purport to be, this emphasises once again the importance of
budgeting for the government. The EPSAS proposal does not mention budgeting.
The Treasury also acknowledges the fundamental conceptual differences
that exist between the two systems,9 which give rise to different figures of deficit
and debts. However, the Treasury still endeavours to reconcile these figures (HM
Treasury, 2013a, p. 22). Even though some academics regard such reconciliations
as a must for fiscal transparency and accountability (Heald & Georgiou, 2011),
the actual meaning of these reconciliations is rather opaque; their purpose could
be to provide comfort to the two preparers involved rather than to have any
useful purpose (Jones & Caruana, 2014). And how the EPSAS (transformed from
IPSAS) will impact this situation is rather mind boggling as to the understand-
ability of the ensuing information, its auditability and control purposes for
budgetary surveillance.
When there is profound disharmony, it is not unnatural to yearn for har-
mony. When the disharmony is accompanied by profound differences in budget-
ing and accounting systems, it is not unusual for non-accountants to call for
harmonised systems. It requires much technical knowledge and understanding
of Anglo-American accounting to explain that this does not follow. On the basis
of what has been written about EPSAS, the proposal shows a similar disconcert-
ing lack of understanding of what Anglo-American accounting actually is.
Independent standard setting of both financial reporting and auditing; and,
consequently, an independent audit of financial statements complying with
those financial reporting standards, which audit is carried out in line with
auditing standards – these are the foundations of Anglo-American accounting.
The EPSAS proposal is silent about these issues.
The expectation given by the EU Commission is that EPSAS will have both
macro- and micro-purposes (Eurostat, 2013). The result that EPSAS will increase
the reliability of national accounts is not something automatic. It is taken for
granted that accrual-based financial statements are properly audited. This is
what makes them a reliable source of information. But if these data are not used
directly for national accounting and need to be turned around to fit national
accounting standards – can you then rationally deduce that national accounting
is reliable? (Jones & Caruana, 2014) Is national accounting itself being audited?
To what extent is it audited or could be audited, and by whom? (Jones, 2003)
The dominance of national accounting over government accounting is
apparent from the feedback received by Eurostat on its public consultation
9 The HM Treasury refers to an article by the Office of National Statistics that explains these
differences, namely Comparison between Public Sector Finance measures from the National
Accounts and Whole of Government Accounts (June 2011).
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regarding the suitability of the IPSAS for EU member states and the resulting
EU Commission’s report (Eurostat, 2013). This is understandable for EU member
states like the UK, given that this statistical reporting is loaded with value
(Jones & Caruana, 2014). While Barton (2011) gives various other reasons why
all governments should use government finance statistics for their decision
making.
Government accounting is a social and institutional practice, like other
types of accounting, and is therefore a product of rational calculations of costs
and benefits by self-interested stakeholders (Hopwood & Miller, 1994). The
choice of accounting policies by governments can be studied as the result of
political and market processes, as in private sector accounting (Watts, 1992). The
implementation of new accounting practices in the public sector is intended to
improve productivity and efficiency, but the emphasis is always directed to the
symbolic power and legitimation roles of accounting information (Carpenter &
Feroz, 1992). Once again, this is manifest in the “logic” of EPSAS, which seems
to have emerged from a financial crisis. The apparent failure of statisticians is
pushing them to seek legitimacy through accounting10 – an institution estab-
lished by the accountancy profession. While statistics cannot be described as a
profession, the standards employed enjoy legal backing, and it is thus trying to
urge accounting to take certain approaches that are not in line with accounting
principles and objectives. Resistance would be the expected reaction from the
accountancy profession given that accounting has always been primarily to
control people’s behaviour (Jones, 1992).
An accrual accounting system may help improve financial reporting for
public sector entities at micro-level. The publication of financial statements of
the various public sector entities could improve accountability and transpar-
ency. The UK Whole of Government Accounts is a meta-consolidation, that is, a
consolidation of consolidated financial statements. The fact that the UK does not
publish financial reports consolidated at central government level perhaps
indicates that macro-fiscal considerations are more important than accountabil-
ity (Heald & Georgiou, 2011, p. 473). For the government practitioner in an EU
member state, rules emanating from the EU would naturally have such focus
and any potential advantages of an accrual accounting system at micro-level
may not be fully appreciated. Moreover, the EPSAS do not cover budgeting; so
what purpose could they serve for control at micro-level?
10 One can note, for example, the emphasis placed on the involvement of the statistical
community in the development of IPSAS, in the comment submitted by the UK’s Office of
National Statistics to Eurostat’s Public Consultation on the Suitability of IPSAS for EU Member
States carried out in 2012.
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Jones et al. (2013, p. 438) conclude:
it is to be hoped that harmonisation … of government budgeting and accounting is not a
necessary part of the resolution of the … eurozone crisis – because, in the light of our
research … the likelihood of harmonisation of national government budgeting and
accounting any time soon beggars belief.
With added emphasis, it is to be hoped that the eurozone crisis will be solved
long before any implementation of any EPSAS proposal. And since it is difficult
to imagine that anyone involved does not share this view, the EPSAS proposal
can only be viewed as a peripheral matter.
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